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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
Jose Luis Perez-Oviedo ("Perez-Oviedo") agreed to be the 
captain of the Adriatik, a Panamanian registered vessel. In 
October of 1999, the Adriatik left the port of Cartagena, 
Colombia and arrived in Barranquilla, Colombia, where it 
was loaded with 800 tons of sugar. The ship left 
Barranquilla and at the mouth of the Magdalena River over 
2 tons of cocaine were loaded from a fishing boat. The 
vessel then proceeded toward its intended final destination 
of Canada. 
 
On November 11, 1999, the HMS Northumberland, on 
board which there was a United States Coast Guard law 
enforcement detachment, intercepted the Adriatik north of 
Trinidad and Tobago. Upon observing signs suggesting 
narcotics smuggling, a Statement of No Objection was 
requested from the Panamanian government for permission 
to search the Adriatik and, if need be, escort it to a United 
States port for an intrusive and destructive search. The 
Panamanian government granted the request. 
 
The Adriatik arrived in the Virgin Islands on November 
13, 1999. Prior to the search, Perez-Oviedo informed a 
Special Agent of the Coast Guard that the cocaine was 
located in the Number 3 starboard tank. A preliminary 
search revealed 400 kilograms of cocaine; a second search 
uncovered another 1700 kilograms. 
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An Information was filed, charging Perez-Oviedo with two 
violations of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
("MDLEA"): one count of knowingly and intentionally 
conspiring to distribute cocaine on board a vessel subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States (in violation of 46 App. 
U.S.C. SS 1903(a) and 1903(j)) and one count of aiding and 
abetting to knowingly and intentionally possessing with the 
intent to distribute cocaine on board a vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States (in violation of 46 App. 
U.S.C. S 1903(a)). Perez-Oviedo pled guilty to the first 
count, preserving the issue of jurisdiction. See  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Prior to sentencing, a motion was filed to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court denied 
the motion, and sentenced Perez-Oviedo to 120 months 
imprisonment. 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
48 U.S.C. S 1612. See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 
993 F.2d 1052, 1054 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 1048, 114 S.Ct. 699 (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. S 3241. 
As to all issues on appeal we are dealing with the 
application of legal precepts to acknowledged facts, and 
therefore our standard of review is plenary. See Martinez- 
Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1054 n. 2. 
 
Perez-Oviedo raises four issues on appeal: 1) whether 
there was a sufficient factual basis for the charge to which 
he pled guilty; 2) whether a nexus to the United States is 
an element of the charge; 3) whether the Due Process limits 
on jurisdiction were exceeded; and 4) whether the 
conviction and sentencing before an Article IV Court were 
unlawful where the allegations involved only Article I high 
seas offenses without any nexus to the Article IV territories. 
 
III. 
 
We address Perez-Oviedo's first two issues together, as 
our analysis of both is identical. Under the first issue, 
Perez-Oviedo argues that he lacked the requisite mens rea 
for conspiracy because he did not intend for the Adriatik or 
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the smuggled cocaine to have any connection to, or to fall 
within the jurisdiction of, the United States. He contends 
on the second issue that a nexus with the United States 
was required under international law. Both of these issues 
are disposed of by way of the statutory language contained 
in S 1903 and our prior holding in Martinez-Hidalgo. Id. 
 
Sections 1903(a) and (j) of the MDLEA state: 
 
       (a) Vessels of United States or vessels subject to 
       jurisdiction of United States 
 
        It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the 
       United States, or on board a vessel subject to the 
       jurisdiction of the United States, or who is a citizen of 
       the United States or a resident alien of the United 
       States on board any vessel, to knowingly or 
       intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess 
       with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled 
       substance. 
 
       (j) Attempt or conspiracy 
 
        Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
       offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the 
       same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
       commission of which was the object of the attempt or 
       conspiracy. 
 
In Martinez-Hidalgo, we held that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the criminal charges despite the 
fact that the vessel in question had no nationality 
(Colombia had disclaimed its registry of the vessel) and the 
final destination for the drugs was likely to be Puerto Rico 
or St. Croix. Id. at 1055. The critical factual distinction to 
be made in Perez-Oviedo's case is that the Adriatik did have 
nationality, it was registered in Panama. Since Panama 
consented to the search of the Adriatik, we hold that the 
government satisfied its jurisdictional requirements under 
the MDLEA.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1903(c)(1)(C) provides that: 
 
       (1) For purposes of this section, a "vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction 
       of the United States" includes-- 
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While the issue previously has not been squarely before 
us, we explained in Martinez-Hidalgo that our holding in 
that case did not depend upon the vessel being stateless. 
We stated that "our holding obviously applies to any 
prosecution under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
Act." Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056 n.6. We 
acknowledged in our discussion that our holding in 
Martinez-Hidalgo was not joining the holding of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Davis, 905 
F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 
1047, 111 S.Ct. 753 (1991), which read into the MDLEA a 
nexus requirement with respect to foreign-registered 
vessels. 
 
In holding that there was no nexus requirement in the 
MDLEA, we refused to distinguish Martinez-Hidalgo from 
Davis on the basis of whether the ship involved was 
stateless or actually registered in another country. 
Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056; see also Klimavicius- 
Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (government 
must prove that criminal conduct will have an effect in the 
United States). Our conclusion rested upon the fact that 
"46 U.S.C. app. S 1903(d) expresses the necessary 
congressional intent to override international law to the 
extent that international law might require a nexus to the 
United States for the prosecution of the offenses defined in 
the [MDLEA]." 993 F.2d at 1056. 
 
Other Courts of Appeal have likewise taken issue with 
the holding in Davis. They have held that no nexus is 
needed between a defendant's criminal conduct and the 
United States in order for there to be jurisdiction, even 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        (C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation 
       has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United 
       States law by the United States. 
 
       Consent or waiver of objection by a foreign nation to the 
       enforcement of United States law by the United States under 
       subparagraph (C) . . . of this paragraph may be obtained by radio, 
       telephone, or similar oral or electronic means, and is conclusively 
       proved by certification of the Secretary of State or the 
Secretary's 
       designee. 
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when the vessel at issue is registered in a foreign country 
(as opposed to being stateless). See, e.g., United States v. 
Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(because Panama consented to the enforcement of the 
MDLEA over the vessel, the jurisdictional requirements of 
the statute were met, despite the timing of the consent after 
the vessel was commandeered by the Coast Guard); United 
States v. Greer, 223 F.3d 41, 54-56 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
(MDLEA's jurisdictional requirement satisfied so long as 
consent of nation to which vessel is registered is received 
prior to trial); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 
(1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 S.Ct. 101 
(1999) (acknowledging the holding of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Davis but nevertheless holding that 
the United States had jurisdiction despite the fact that the 
vessel was registered in Venezuela). Perez-Oviedo's first two 
issues are without merit. The vessel's final destination of 
Canada and lack of a nexus to the United States are wholly 
irrelevant to our analysis of the jurisdiction of the United 
States to prosecute him under the MDLEA given that the 
Panamanian government consented to the search. 
 
With regard to Perez-Oviedo's third issue, we previously 
held in Martinez-Hidalgo that no due process violation 
occurs in an extraterritorial prosecution under the MDLEA 
when there is no nexus between the defendant's conduct 
and the United States. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056- 
57. Since drug trafficking is condemned universally by law- 
abiding nations, we reasoned that there was no reason for 
us to conclude that it is " `fundamentally unfair' for 
Congress to provide for the punishment of a person 
apprehended with narcotics on the high seas." Id. at 1056; 
see also 46 App. U.S.C. S 1902 (where Congress specifically 
found in the MDLEA that "trafficking in controlled 
substances aboard vessels is a serious international 
problem and is universally condemned"). Perez-Oviedo's 
state of facts presents an even stronger case for concluding 
that no due process violation occurred. The Panamanian 
government expressly consented to the application of the 
MDLEA (unlike the stateless vessel in Martinez-Hidalgo). 
Such consent from the flag nation eliminates a concern 
that the application of the MDLEA may be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair. See, e.g., Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. 
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Perez-Oviedo's reference to cases such as International Shoe 
Machine Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 
(1945), and Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court 
of California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987), is 
unavailing, for those cases, which deal with non-resident 
corporations subject to liability for placing goods in the 
stream of commerce of another state, are inapposite. 
 
Perez-Oviedo's fourth issue can be disposed of in short 
order. In United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894, 897 (3d Cir. 
1983), we declined to hold that only an Article III judge 
could preside over the trial where the charge was a 
violation of the criminal law of the United States. We also 
held that no due process violation occurs when the trial of 
a criminal charge takes place before a judge enjoying the 
limited tenure afforded to judges of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. Id. Perez-Oviedo's position that his 
conviction and sentencing before an Article IV Court was 
unlawful because the allegations involved only Article I high 
seas offenses without any nexus to the Article IV territories 
also fails. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reason, the District Court's judgment of 
June 8, 2001 will be affirmed in all respects. 
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